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Only eight months after the March “referendum” 
on Crimean secession from Ukraine, two promi-
nent German Social Democratic politicians caused 
a stir by proposing the recognition a posteriori of  
the Russian annexation of  the peninsula. Matthias 
Platzeck, head of  the German-Russian Forum 
and former prime minister of  Brandenburg, and 
Egon Bahr, former companion of  Willy Brandt 
and inventor of  German Ostpolitik, each proposed 
“solutions” to this contentious issue. Bahr sug-
gested accepting the annexation without formal 
recognition, in much the same way West Germany 
stabilized its relationship with East Germany in the 
early 1970s. But Bahr’s historical analogy ignores 
the fact that it took West Germany many years, not 
months, to arrive at its “new eastern policy.” It also 
ignores the fact that Crimea today is not merely 
within Russia’s sphere of  influence (as the GDR 
had been in the Soviet Union’s) but that it has been 
made part of  the Russian Federation by means of  
military takeover, thinly disguised with a “Potemkin 
referendum.”1
Although Platzeck and Bahr represent a decidedly 
marginal position in the political arena, they do 
seem to echo a general sentiment in the German 
public, which short of  formally accepting the anne-
xation, favors treating it as a fait accompli on the 
grounds of  geopolitical necessity. In a recent sur-
vey, 39 percent of  Germans wanted to recognize 
Crimea as part of  Russia, while 48 percent opposed 
this.2 According to the pro-recognition argument, if  
we cannot do anything to bring Crimea back, why 
not just accept it and move on? The majority of  
Crimea’s population was in favor of  annexation, so 
the argument continues, and one must remember 
the long history of  Russian presence in Crimea, 
including the presence of  the Black Sea Fleet. 
After all, aren’t Russian actions in Crimea somehow 
“understandable”? Echoing Russia’s own logic, 
this argument sounds the bell for a “post-Crimea” 
phase that, implicitly or explicitly, recognizes – and 
legitimizes – Russia’s actions.
Such thinking blatantly ignores those who oppo-
sed the annexation and are now forced to live as 
part of  the Russian Federation. Most visibly this 
includes the vulnerable Crimean Tatar minority 
who, after about twenty years of  relatively peaceful 
existence in their homeland, are once again under 
pressure. Contrary to what Russia promised the 
Crimean Tatar community, we are now seeing a 
crackdown on Tatar political and media organi-
zations (under the pretext of  fighting “political 
extremism”) and mounting harassment of  Crimean 
Tatars. Russia’s annexation of  2014 could well 
become the “third tragedy” of  the Crimean Tatar 
community – after the Russian conquest of  1783 
and Stalin’s mass deportations of  1944.3
A History of Repression
While the community of  Crimean Tatars shrank 
following the takeover of  Crimea by the Russian 
empire from the Ottoman Empire in 1783, it was 
under Stalin that Crimean Tatars faced their most 
brutal treatment in the peninsula. After regaining 
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Crimea in 1944, following its occupation by Nazi 
and Romanian forces, Stalin ordered the deporta-
tion of  Crimean Tatars on the pretext of  alleged 
collaboration with the Nazis. Around 240,000 
Crimean Tatars were deported to the far east of  the 
Soviet Union. Only around half  of  them survived.
Despite their strategy of  nonviolent resistance, 
Crimean Tatars continued to face oppression under 
the Soviet regime. The charismatic leader of  the 
Crimean Tatars, Mustafa Dzhemilev (b. 1943), was 
interned numerous times as a Soviet dissident and 
holds the record for the longest hunger strike (303 
days). Only under glasnost in the final years of  the 
Soviet period were Crimean Tatars finally allowed to 
return to Crimea, but they received no assistance for 
their relocation nor were they recompensed for their 
deportation.
Toward the end of  the Soviet regime, the stream of  
Crimean Tatars returning to their homeland increased 
steadily (Chart 2). Later, within the newly independent 
Ukrainian state, Crimean Tatars slowly gained more 
rights and assistance to strengthen their community 
institutions and self-governance structures. Most 
importantly, a council of  representatives of  Crimean 
Tatars – the Mejlis – was recognized in 1999.4
Yet Crimean Tatars remained at risk from discri-
mination. Certainly, tensions between Crimean 
Tatars and pro-Russian groups preceded Crimea’s 
annexation.5 Pro-Russian groups in Crimea patho-
logized the Tatar community as “extremist nati-
onalist” and “Islamist” and continued to blame 
Tatars for alleged collaborated with the Nazis.6 
Land allocation also led to tensions: starting in the 
mid-2000s, Crimean Tatars began to settle land 
without permission from the Crimean authorities, 
protesting the authorities’ failure to allocate land to 
them fairly. In response pro-Russian groups would 
regularly picket this land, arguing the Crimean 
Tatars were illegal squatters.7 The same pro-Russian 
groups whose antagonism toward Crimean Tatars 
was visible before 2014 were the ones who eventu-
ally facilitated Russia’s annexation of  the peninsula 
in March.8 
However, the Ukrainian state authorities remained 
suspicious of  Crimean Tatars, too, and were unwil-
ling to adopt legislation that would recognize them 
as an indigenous people of  Ukraine – or at least, 
not until after Russia’s annexation.9 The situation 
for Crimean Tatars was thus tense even before the 
annexation, not only because of  the limited desire 
within Ukraine to make life easier for Crimean 
Tatars but also because of  the confrontations with 
antagonistic pro-Russian groups.10
Broken Promises
Within Crimea, Crimean Tatars have been the most 
active opponents of  the annexation, boycotting 
the referendum en masse in March as well as the 
parliamentary elections in September, despite the 
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Source: Gwendolyn Sasse, The Crimea Question: Identity, Transition, 
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Chart 2: Number of Crimean Tatars in 
Crimea (1967–2012)
Source: Andrew Wilson (University of Glasgow), “Needs Assessment for 
the Crimean Tatars and Other Formerly Deported Peoples of 
the Crimea” (privately published paper), December 14, 2012. 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2309854> 
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pressure put onto the community in the run-up to 
both events. According to media reports, houses 
of  Crimean Tatar were singled out with X-shaped 
marks on their front doors before the referendum, 
evoking memories of  similar actions before the 
deportation in 1944.11
After the annexation, Moscow initially tried to 
ease the concerns of  Crimean Tatars by including 
them into the Russian Act for the rehabilitation 
of  repressed ethnic groups. However, many other 
promises – for example, for political autonomy 
and quotas in government bodies – remained 
unfulfilled. The events that followed the annexa-
tion showed the true nature of  the new Russian 
approach toward Crimean Tatars. By co-opting 
such rival institutions as the marginal pro-Russian 
Milli Firka Party, and intimidating those it sees as 
its biggest opponents (in particular Mustafa Dzhe-
milev, the former leader of  the Mejlis, the Crimean 
Tatar council), Crimean and Russian authorities 
sought to break Crimean Tatar resistance. This 
April Dzhemilev was the first to be banned from 
returning to Crimea (for five years). A ban on the 
current leader of  the Mejlis, Refat Chubarov, follo-
wed in July. In September the Mejlis – along with 
a charitable foundation it runs – was raided and 
ordered closed on grounds that it was “never pro-
perly registered.”12 
Mosques and Crimean Tatar homes have also been 
raided in search of  “weapons, drugs, and prohibi-
ted literature,” and Crimean Tatar commemorations 
of  the Day of  Deportation (May 18) were ban-
ned just days before the event, even though pro-
Russian celebrations were allowed to occur.13 In 
addition, a number of  Crimean Tatar activists have 
disappeared or been forcibly abducted, with pro-
Russian paramilitary groups involved. Some were 
later found dead, but investigations have yielded no 
results.14
Crimean Tatar media platforms, such as the TV sta-
tion ATR, have also received official and informal 
warnings for their allegedly “extremist activities” 
– for example reporting about cases of  harassment 
and referring to the events of  March as an “occup-
ation” or “annexation.”15 Crimean Tatar journalists 
have therefore resorted to “self-censorship” in 
order to avoid possible arrest or forced closure, as 
happened to the Crimean newspaper Avdet.
Dzhemilev has described this treatment as “history 
repeating itself.” According to the former dissi-
dent, the authorities are falling back on the same 
kind of  rhetoric once used by the Soviet regime to 
label Crimean Tatars as “anti-Soviet” and “extre-
mist.”16 For the Russian and Crimean authorities, 
the Crimean Tatars pose the greatest potential for 
mobilization against Crimea’s annexation as a well-
organized and vocal community with a history of  
counter-authoritarian protest. The oppression cam-
paign against the Crimean Tatars is therefore likely 
to continue in the future.
Time for Pressure, Not Acceptance
Here in Western Europe it is perhaps tempting 
to wonder: why bicker about a small peninsula? 
Accepting the annexation could perhaps pave the 
way for the very “restart in relations with Russia” 
that the new EU High Representative Federica 
Mogherini has called for – and provide the ground 
for abolishing those sanctions that are crippling 
the Russian economy. However this path would 
accept the injustice and illegality of  Russia’s actions 
in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. Rather, a genuine 
“restart” can only work when Russia steers away 
from its Darwinist approach to international law, 
but the prospects for this remain very bleak indeed.
Instead of  harboring premature and fruitless dis-
cussions about whether or not to accept the anne-
xation, Germany and the international community 
should exert more pressure on Russia regarding its 
treatment of  the Crimean Tatar minority.
Inasmuch as Russia has demanded that Kiev respect 
the rights of  the Russian-speaking population in 
Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (whether they were actu-
ally threatened or not shall not be elaborated here), the 
same duties apply to Russia as an occupying power 
in Crimea. It is not sufficient to criticize only the de-
facto authorities in Crimea for their maltreatment of  
Crimean Tatars. However, it was the extension of  
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Russian legislation into Crimea that now provides 
the pretexts for the raids and harassments that are 
currently taking place, just as Russian prosecutors and 
FSB agents are now involved in persecuting Crimean 
Tatars. Russia must comply with international human 
rights law, including all treaties ratified by Russia, such 
as the European Convention on Human Rights.
A return of  Crimea to Ukraine may be unlikely in 
the foreseeable future, but this fact does not relieve 
the international community of  its responsibility to 
pay close attention to what is actually happening on 
the peninsula.
Therefore, Germany and the international com-
munity should first and foremost pressure Russia 
to ensure access to Crimea for the OSCE’s Special 
Monitoring Mission and to allow the establishment 
of  a permanent OSCE presence to operate and 
report on the situation.
Secondly, OSCE participating states should con-
vene informal and open Permanent Council brie-
fings on Crimea with representatives from civil 
society and other international organizations to 
report on developments and discuss international 
responses.
Thirdly, the UN Security Council should adopt a 
Chapter VI resolution, urging the de facto authori-
ties of  Crimea and Russia to implement the recom-
mendations in the reports on Crimea by the UN 
Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine and 
the Council of  Europe commissioner for human 
rights.17
Forgetting about Crimea and the fate of  the 
Crimean Tatars means implicitly acknowledging 
Russia’s claim to the region. Instead, the internatio-
nal community must demonstrate to Russia that its 
arbitrary interpretation of  international law regar-
ding Crimea has long-term consequences. We are 
not yet in a post-Crimea phase. On the contrary: 
with the annexation of  Crimea, a new era has just 
begun.
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